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Williams: Conflict of Laws: Does "Place of Performance" Governs the Essential Validity of a Contract?
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
should the question come before it, to reach a decision compatible
with the better reasoned principles of modern authority. The
decisions of other CODE jurisdictions" may be easily distinguished as governed by provisions not in our CODE. In any
event they are not controlling and the question is left open to
the court."
-J. Chandice Ettien

CONFLICT OF LAWS: DOES R. C. M. 1935, SECTION
7537 REQUIRE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
"PLACE OF PERFORMANCE" GOVERNS
THE ESSENTIAL VALIDITY OF
A CONTRACT?
It is quite generally conceded that the weight of authority
throughout the United States is that where a contract is made
in one state either to be performed there or elsewhere the law
of the state where the contract was entered into governs its
validity; i. e., whether any legal rights or duties arise from the
contract against either party in favor of the other.' Surprisingly enough the Montana Supreme Court has never as yet
"Supra, Notes 21, 23 and 24.
"In the event that the court does not see its way clear to accept the conclusions of this comment it is submitted that the Montana legislature
should repeal the statute. The rule, as apparently reached in the jurisdictions of Dakota and Oklahoma, has no foundation in reason.
Slight inquiry will show that it is contrary to the usual practice. Minors often act through agents in the ordinary course of their transactions.
It was suggested in 2 CALIF. L. Rav. 312 (1914) that Section 33
of the California Code (corresponding to §5678 of the Montana Code)
be amended to read: "A minor under the age of eighteen cannot directly or by a delegation of power make contracts relating to real
property or personal property not in his immediate possession. . ...
If such an amendment were enacted, the section would become merely
a limitation on the infant's personal capacity. Further, it would involve difficulties of interpretation. What does the commentator mean
by the words "immediate possession"? Does he mean a present vested
interest or actual physical possession?
CONFLICT OF LAWS §332, 2 BEALIF, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) §332.4, p. 1090, GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938)
§107, p. 273. Some writers disliking the generally prevailing rule cite
the result of Beale's 1910 survey which shows a plurality of states
favoring the rule that the place of performance governs the essential
validity of a contract. See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) p.
207.
2Historically, at least, three possibilities have been recognized: First,
apply the law that the parties intend should apply; Second, apply the
law of the place of performance; Third, the accepted weight of
authority rule, apply the law of the place of contracting.

'RESTATEMENT,
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definitely determined this issue, although it has several times
been presented with situations which might conceivably have
called for its decision. In this connection it is interesting to
note that two eminent authorities in the field of Conflct of
Laws have, after examination of various Montana statutes and
cases, reached opposite results in determining what the law in
Montana is. Professor Beale concludes that on the strength
of these cases Montana may "tentatively" be classified among
those states following the rule of the place of contracting governs the validity and effect of a contract.! Professor Cormack,
on the other hand, considering practically the same cases in
the light of a CODE provision which he considers relevent, coneludes that "all contract matters are governed by the law of
the place of performance".' The statute which is apparently
the basis of Mr. Cormack's conclusion was adopted by Montana
in 1895, having been copied in its entirety from the FIELD
CODE.' Its full text is as follows:
"A contract is to be interpreted according to the law
and usage of the place where it is to be performed; or, if
it does not indicate a place of performance, according to
the law and usage of the place where it is made.'"
If one has in mind the Conflicts problem and regards this
Section alone without reference to the other Sections of the
Chapter' in which it is cited it may seem that the Section is a
loose statement of the performance rple; that is, that the law
of the place of performance governs the essential validity of
BwP-, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §332.34, p. 1152.
'Cormack, California Conflict of Laws in Regard to Contracts, 12 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 335, 363 (1938-39).
'The FIELD CoDE was compiled in 1865 by order of the New York State
Legislature but was never adopted by that state.
* R. C. M. 1935, §7537. In this connection another CODE provision
should be noted. R. C. M. 1935, §10518, provides: "The language of
a writing is to be interpreted according to the meaning it bears in
the place of its execution, unless the parties have reference to a different place." If it be considered that the word "reference" establishes an exception only when the parties expressly stipulate that the
law of the place of performance is to control, then the two sections
are in conflict. But on the other hand, as Professor Cormack points
out, it might well be considered that §10518 is simply a loose statement of the same principle as is advanced by §7537. In any event as
§7537 refers to contracts and §10518 to writings, applying the canon
of construction that the. specific controls the general, as writings are
broader than contracts, §7537 being more specific is controlling.
'On examination of other Sections of Chapter 108, R. C. M. 1935, it
will be noted that the entire chapter deals with the problem of ascertaining the Intention of the parties. It would seem that this is
certainly a strong indication of the proper meaning to be given to
§7537.
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the contract. It is obvious that whether or not this statute does
refer to validity depends on the construction to be given to
the word "interpret". "Interpret", like most other words, has
been assigned a variety of meanings in the law as well as elsewhere. However, its generally accepted meaning when used
in connection with contracts indicates ascertainment of the intention of the parties as indicated by the meaning of the words,
phrases, and clauses separately considered, as distinguished
from the legal effect of the contract as a whole-the latter, on
the other hand, involving its essential validity.
That the word does not and never was intended to include
"essential validity" becomes apparent when one considers the
annotations to this Section in the final draft of the original
CODE as submitted by the Code Commission to the New
FiPT
York Legislature. Sections 270 and 280 of JosEPn STORY'S
work on Conflict of Laws are cited in support of the first clause
of what now is R. C. M. 1935, Section 7537. Section 282 of the
same work supports the second clause. In order to gather the
full import of the cited sections it is necessary to consider other
sections of that work bearing on the general problem. Sections
242, 243 and 244 advance the general rule that validity of the
contract is to be determined by the law of the place where the
contract was made. Section 263 states that the place of contracting governs the nature, obligation, and interpretation of
the contract. The same section refers to and defines what is
meant by the nature of a contract. Section 266 refers to the
obligation of the contract, carefully distinguishing it from the
nature of the contract. Section 270' refers to the interpretation
of contracts, distinguishing this from both nature and obligation. After thus establishing the general proposition that the
place of contracting governs the validity, interpretation, nature,
and obligation of a contract, STORY qualifies this rule in section
'BPTAE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §346.2, p. 1201; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) §109, p. 288 ; 22 WORDS AND PHRASES 214; DiciY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1922) p. 623; SAVrONY, CONFLICT OF LAWS

(2d ed. 1880) p. 243.
. . the object is to ascertain the real intention of the parties in

".

their stipulations; and when these are silent, or ambiguous, to ascertain, what is the true sense of the words used, and what ought to be
implied in order to give them full effect.... But in many cases the
words used have different meanings in different places by law or by
custom; and where the words are themselves obscure or ambiguous,
custom and usage in a particular glace may give them an exact and
appropriate meaning. Hence, the rule has found admission into almost all, if not all, systems of jurisprudence, that, if the common
intention of the parties does not appear from the words of the contract, and if it can be interpreted by any custom or usage of the
place, where it is made, that course is to be adopted ... "-SToRY,
CONFLICT OF LAws (1834) §270, p. 225.
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280" by stating that the rules already considered suppose that
performance of the contract is to be in the place of making, but
that if the contract is to be performed in another place, that
law will govern. Section 282' is more or less a repetition of the
rules previously stated but does serve to suport the second clause
of the Code Section.
The reader's attention is called to the fact that it is not
the purpose of this article either to support or discredit the doctrines advanced by STORY in the cited sections. The sole purpose in referring to them is to indicate the clear distinction
maintained therein between "interpret" and "essential validity". In the light of this distinction, it is logical to conclude
that the framers of the CODE intended the word "interpret" in
its normal sense as used by STORY in section 270, that is, to refer
only to the ascertainment of the effect of words, phrases, and
clauses separately, and not to "essential validity"."
However, also cited under the original FIELD CODE Section

are several early cases," all without exception involving commercial contracts for the payment of money. These cases seem
to support STORY'S position that the place of performance
(when indicated) governs validity, nature, and obligation as
well as interpretation,1' but each consistently recognizes and
maintains a distinction between the four. There certainly is
nothing in any of these cases to justify the view that the Code
Commission included them for the purpose of expanding the
"The rules already considered suppose, that the performance of the
contract is to be in the place, where it is made, either expressly or
by tacit implication. But where the contract is either expressly or
tacitly to be performed in any other place, there the general rule is,
in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be
governed by the law of the place of performance .... .
STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws (1834) §280, p. 233.

u"... In general, it may be said, that, If no place of performance is
stated, or the contract may indifferently be performed anywhere, It
ought to be referred to the l-ea loci contractus...
"
STORY, CONFLICT
OF' LAW (1834) §282, p. 235.
The fact is that Professor Cormack briefly recognizes the argument
that "interpretation" simply has to do with determining meaning, and
nothing more, but immediately rejects that position. Just what more,
or how much more he thinks it should include, is not ascertainable
from his paper. Cormack, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 338, note 20.
"Thompson v. Ketcham (1811) 8 Johns (N. Y.) 189; Jacks v. Nicols
(1851) 5 N. Y. 178; Bowen v. Newell (1855) 13 N. Y. 290; Curtis v.
Leavitt (1875) 15 N. Y. 9; Everett v. Vendryes (1860) 19 N. Y. 436;
Cutler v. Wright (1860) 22 N. Y. 480; Gibbs v. Fremont (1854) 9
Exch. (Eng.) 25.
"Courts in this period often accepted uncritically this rule as stated
by Story. Such formulation of the rule has long since been abandoned.
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meaning of the word "interpret" to the extent of including
"validity", "nature", and "obligation" within its scope.
Possibly Professor Cormack does not deny that the two
questions: "What law governs the essential validity of a contract", and "What law and usage governs the interpretation
of a contract", are distinct and separate. He concludes, however, that if the law of the place of performance is to be used
to govern interpretation it must also control all other matters
relating to the contract. Had the Commission intended the
CODE as framed to include "validity", "nature", and "obligation" as well as "interpretation", surely they would have either
added those terms or formulated other Sections adopting the
performance rule in relation to the essential validity of a contract. But Professor Cormack states that to use the place of
performance to decide matters of interpretation and at the same
time to apply the law of the place of execution to other matters
relating to essential validity, would result in "a distorted unnatural system not yet conceived by any jurist.' "' But it is
submitted that referring both to the place of performance to
determine the "meaning" of the words and phrases used, and
then looking to the lex loci contractus or any other relevant law
to determine whether it creates any rights upon the words and
phrases as used in the contract, is no more inconsistent than
looking into a dictionary to get a more accurate definition of
the words in the contract and then looking to whatever law the
court thinks the appropriate one to ascertain the legal rights
raised thereon, if any. This statement intends to emphasize
that there are two fundamentally different problems involved
-not contradictory, but rather complementary to each other;
also that a given body of "law" may be referred to and utilized
for fundamentally different purposes. So to refer to a given
"law" simply as part of the usage of language in a given society does not even raise the question of what law should be
considered to shape and measure and determine whether any
rights arise from the contract.
Discussions by competent authorities as to the nature of
the problem of "interpretation" support the above conclusions."

Both the RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACTS

and

WILLISTON

"Cormack,

op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 339.
"3 WITL sror, CoNTRAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 601, p. 1726; RESTATEMENT
CONTRACTS, §266; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, §332 comment f,
p. 346.

Professor Cormack indicates that the RESTATEMENT position

in regard to what law will be referred to to determine interpretation
is not clear, but he concludes that it reasonably follows that whatever
law governs "the nature and extent of the duty" will govern interpretation and adds that this is perhaps sufficiently indicated by §332
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consider the question to be one purely of fact,"to be ascertained
by any one (or perhaps a combination) of several different possible "standards" or canons of interpretation." R. C. M. 1935,
Section 7537, seems to be a perfect example of a standard of
"limited usage" (standard number 2 as given in footnote 19
supra) justified by a presumption based upon standard number "5"; i. e., what, at least at one time, the legislature presumed would be the "reasonable expectations" of the parties
as to the meaning of the words used.
But it may be asked, "Does not the reference to the foreign
law and usage necessarily make the CoDE Section a rule governed
by the same broad principles as determine what law governs
essential validity ?"" The answer is that the significance of the
reference should be measured by the purpose of the reference.
Such reference certainly can be for more than one purpose."
(f). Cormack, op. cit.supra note 4, at p. 338, note 20. It is submitted that when §332 is considered in the light of §346, which clearly
establishes the independence of the two questions, it becomes apparent that the framers of the RESTATEMENT had no intention of considering the question of "interpretation" in §332 comment (f). Indeed, comment a to §332 would seem to make that clear enough.
T
" The word "fact" as used here is still different from that used when
we speak of the forum referring to another state's law as a "fact".
In the latter, the reference is made directly to determine whether and
how any allged right would be created by the other state. In the
former case, the forum refers to that law simply to ascertain as
nearly as possible what was in the parties' minds when they drafted
the contract. This does not Ignore the fact that an "objective"
standard often will be applied, not necessarily establishing the actual
meaning of the particular parties.
"Trhe RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §227 enumerates among conceivable
standards of interpretation the following:. 1. The standard of general usage; 2. A standard of limited usage; 3. A mutual standard;
4. An individual standard; 5. A standard of reasonable expectation;
6. A standard of reasonable understanding.
"True, merely because such a word as "interpretation" is defined in a
certain way for internal law purposes, it does not necessarily follow
that the same meaning should be given it for Conflict of Laws purposes. (Neither does it follow that it must have a different meaning). But our real question here is whether the problem of interpretation ever enters the realm of Conflict of Laws. Neither because, at
a later stage of the litigation, a Ccnflicts question may arise, or a rule
hL.ving the appearance of a rule of interpretation but directly affecting the extent of the duty is applied, does it follow that the preliminary question of meaning of a particular instrument is a Conflicts
question.
*That the forum may look to the extent of a foreign law for fundamentally different purposes, so that, in some cases it should not be
considered as "law" in any sense, is strikingly recognized by Dicey
in considering the difference in the significance of certain of his
"principles" of Conflicts. In analyzing the legal import of the incorporation of a succession section of the Code Napoleon in an Englishman's will, to indicate how the latter's heirs shaU take, he observes: "... It is, of course, perfectly plain that the Code would (not)
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In this instance, we refer to the "law and usage" of the place
of performance under a standard of limited usage for determining the meaning of the parties. Note especially that law and
usage are stated as serving identically the same purpose. Here
the "law" involved is only one of various possible sources for
that meaning. It has no significance at all as "law" distinct
from "usage"; they both equally are sources, and nothing
more.
There is one further question, which, though somewhat
collateral to the primary one of this comment, merits brief attention. Should this Section be deemed to raise a conclusive
presumption as to what social unit should be looked to to determine the meaning of the words used, or should it be interpreted as only stating a prima facie presumption, overcome by
direct evidence that the parties have selected language with
reference to some other locality than the place of performance.
Consistently with its primary purpose of serving as a direction
to the court to ascertain meaning, it should be construed as
only raising a rebuttable presumption. Although the common
law view is generally stated in a form similar to that of this
statute, writers conclude that such a rule will not prevent the
forum from giving effect to an expressed contrary intention
of the parties.' Although in its wording it gives the impression
be the source of the rights acquired by the will; the source would be
the law of England giving effect to the intention of the testator ....
What for our present purpose deserves particular attention is that
reference to foreign law under Principle Number V and Number IV
is due to different Causes .. " DicEy, CONFIUCr oF LAWS (4th ed.
1927) pp. 51-2.
Likewise, it seems that, whether our own Code Section is a Conflict of Laws rule in any sense, may depend upon the purpose for
which the forum refers to the foreign law. Since it may be referred
to for fundamentally different purposes, the mere fact that it is referred to does not establish that the rule of reference is a choice of
law, or any other kind of Conflict of Laws rule. Of. Cormack, op. cit.
supra note 4, at p. 338, note 20; GOODRIcH, tc. cit. supra note 8. Of
course, if X, as the place of performance, declares that any contract
calling for, say, delivery of "number one barley" shall entitle the buyer
to demand barley testing 62, regardless of what the parties meant by
that phrase, it would seem that that is what the contract as drafted
would mean, but this is not a case of Interpretation, but rather of the
"legal effect" of the use of a certain "symbol" in the agreement. Also
see 3 WILLISTO1' ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) p. 1728.

"As Dean Goodrich points out: "This is a wholly different point from
that involved in allowing them (the parties) to choose the law to
govern the obligation. Here there is no question of validity; the sole
question is that of fixing the meaning of language, and there is no
more difficulty in giving effect to a Texas use of a term in a Missouri
contract than in giving effect to a French or German instead of English as a means of expression, providing the parties show what they
mean." GOODRICH, CONFLICT or LAws (2d ed. 1938) §109, p. 290.
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of being mandatory, referring again to its history it will be
noted that it is merely a codification of the common law view
expressed by STORY in sections 270 and 280; i. e., that reference
to the place of performance for the purpose of interpretation is
in conformity with the presumed intention of the parties.
Hence, if the parties stipulate in their contract that they will
use certain commercial or legal terms unknown elsewhere but
in common usage in Shanghai, China, either because it is the
place of performance, or is the donicil of either or both parties,
or the place of contracting, or for whatever reason, the Court
unhesitatingly would seek the meaning of those terms as found
in Shanghai.
So we may conclude that Section 7537 involves a question
anterior and preliminary to any real Conflict of Laws question; one that the forum will assume that it shall decide as a
matter of course, and which hence, at least in traditional terms,
is procedural' in character. Likewise, it would seem not unreasonable further to classify this Section as an "internal"
rule. Although each of these statements merit extended discussion, the mere fact that it is arguable that our Section may
be so classified, suggests the conclusion that no particular rule
controlling the legal rights growing from a contract, should be
dragged into the law of Montana, merely because of the rule of
presumption as to how to determine the meaning intended by
the parties to a contract, found in that Section. The object of
these comments will be served if the Montana Supreme Court
(so far as Section 7537 is concerned) should consider itself
wholly free to confirm the implication of the existing Montana
cases that the place of contracting governs the essential validity
"There seems little doubt that Section 7537 is properly classified as
"procedural" in that a Montana Court would apply It as a matter of
course in all cases appearing before it involving the meaning of a
contract. According to orthodox approach, this should be enough to
raise a presumption that other courts referring to Montana law to
govern the validity of a contract, should not include Section 7537 in
their reference. Our interpretation of the proper purpose of that
Section likewise would support that presumption in the absence of
affirmative evidence that Montana law in some way intends that the
Section should be treated as directly affecting the right-duty relationship growing from a Montana contract. The mere fact that the Section appears in our CIvrL CODS, instead of our CODE oF Cwnm PRoCEDURE
should not be treated as such affirmative evidence. Whether the technique of "interpretation" should be considered to be so intimately associated with the substantive rights of the contract that the foreign
law's rules of interpretation always should be included in a reference
by the forum, is an independent question that cannot be considered
here. See Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L. J. 333 (1932-33).
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of the contract," or to select some other rule determining that
question if it feels that there are sufficiently persuasive reasons
therefore.
-Shelton R. Williams.

CORPORATIONS: WHEN MAY A MONTANA
CORPORATION COLLECT ON ITS SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACTS?*
By a well established business practice in Montana a corporation generally commences business immediately upon receipt of the certificate of incorporation from the secretary of
state. It is generally recognized that a corporation may sue on
its pre-incorporation subscriptions as soon as it may begin business. Yet, the case of Enterprise Sheet Metal Works v. Schendel,1 decided by the Montana Supreme Court in 1918, held that
a stock subscriber was not obligated on his subscription until
'As has been noted previously the Supreme Court of Montana has
never conclusively answered this question. However at least two Montana cases, Bank of Commerce v. Fuqua (1891) 11 Mont. 258, 28 P.
291; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bordeau (1922) 64 Mont. 60,
208 P. 947, contain dicta to the effect that validity of a contract will
be determined by the law of the place of execution. In McManus v.
Fulton (1929) 85 Mont. 170, 278 P. 126, the place of making and of
performance were the same. But the court applies the law of that
place as the law of the place of making rather than as of the place
of performance; thus justifying the presumption that a Montana Court
will look to the law of the place of contracting to govern essential
validity. Capital Finance Corp. v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 75 Mont.
460, 243 P. 1061, does not shed much light either way, both Beale and
Cormack claiming it as authority for their respective arguments. While
not conclusive these cases would seem to justify Professor Beale's
contention that Montana may tentatively be placed among the state's
applying to the law of the place of contracting McDonald et al. v.
McNinch (1922) 63 Mont. 308, 206 P. 1096 applies §7935 to a strictly
domestic case to determine the meaning of the parties, which supports
the conclusion that the section does not necessarily state a choice of
law rule. Story v. Stanfield (C. C. A. 9th, 1921) 275 Fed. 401, cites
this Section in enforcing a contract which apparently it assumes was
completed in Montana. But the exact ground upon which the court
Includes this Section In Its reference to Montana law is not clear.
*The writer wishes to acknowledge that Henry I. Grant, Jr., of the
graduating class of 1940 made a helpful study of this problem during
the Fall and Winter of 1939 and 1940.
1(1918) 55 Mont. 42, 173 P. 1059. The case simply gives effect to a
frequently recognized common law defense agains,. calls on either
pre-incorporation or post incorporation subscriptions to an original
issue (but apparently not to a subsequent increase in capitalization),
and concludes that there was nothing in Montana law either requiring
or justifying a change in the rule admitting that defense. Donn &
BAKER, CASES ON C,:AP0.0TrONS (1940)

p. 848.
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